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December 2, 2003 
The need for transformation is well known and articulated at NATO Headquarters. As NATO Secretary 
General Lord Robertson stated in November 2003, "I put it bluntly, the overwhelming part of the (Alliance's) 
soldiers are useless for the kind of missions we are mounting today. In other words, the non-U.S. NATO 
countries have lots of soldiers, but far too few of them can be deployed."[1] Despite intense American and 
NATO pressure for European military reform, and acknowledgement of the need for reform in several 
European capitals, the European Allies have been slow to make the required adaptations. This Strategic 
Insight argues that unless real progress is made in the transformation of NATO forces, the ever-widening 
gap between U.S. and European defense capabilities threatens the coherence of the Alliance and its 
effectiveness as a force for stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.  
Transformation Scorecard 
NATO has a mixed record in adapting to the rapidly changing situation of the post-Cold War world. On the 
positive side, the Alliance made a rapid reorientation after the fall of the Soviet Union. Fearing a potential 
wave of instability and crisis resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the sixteen NATO heads of 
state set the Alliance along a new strategic path during the NATO summits of 1991 and 1994. Although 
NATO no longer faced a direct threat to its territory (a threat being defined as an entity holding both the 
intention and capability to threaten the sovereignty or vital interests of a NATO member), it did not believe 
that its mission was complete, as some observers suggested at the time. Rather, the Allies agreed that 
the alliance ought to continue because they continued to face security risks. These risks primarily 
threaten order and stability: ethnic conflict, mass population migration, economic disturbances, ecological 
disasters, terrorist activity, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  
To meet this new environment, NATO members redirected the political and military arms of the alliance to 
reach out to former adversaries—including Russia—to promote cooperation, dialogue and transparency 
in military operations and defense spending. In 1994 this effort was formalized in the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP), an organization that European non-NATO nations could each separately join to work with 
NATO on interoperability, peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations.[2] PfP was not 
a collective security organization. Partner members did not receive assurances that NATO would protect 
them in times of aggression. The fledgling democracies desired more. What began as a whisper rose to a 
clamor for the Alliance to embrace new members. Russia at first objected. It hinted at a resumption of the 
Cold War and even speculated on the difficulty of keeping a peace when NATO expanded to the very 
border of Mother Russia.[3] The shrillest of these voices reminded the world that Russia still possessed 
nuclear weapons.[4]  
With the release of the Enlargement Study in 1995, NATO announced it would invite new members at 
some point. The study made clear that the purpose of enlargement was to foster security, stability and 
prosperity for those nations seeking to join the community of free-market democracies.[5] Since that time, 
three new members—Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary—have joined the Alliance and seven 
more have been invited and are expected to sign the Protocols of Accession in 2004.[6] Russia, under the 
steadying influence of President Vladimir Putin, has so far remained relatively quiescent throughout the 
process.[7]  
Clouds on the Horizon 
Despite the initial success of transformation into a twenty-first century organization, NATO showed some 
underlying weaknesses in the late 1990s—especially during the Kosovo conflict. U.S. assets conducted 
most of the combat air operation of 1999 against the Serbian and Yugoslav forces in Kosovo because of 
the inability of European members to integrate with the high-tech U.S. Air Force. This disparity in 
capabilities extended beyond air operations to land and maritime components as well. Even more critical, 
NATO lacked the key intelligence and command and control mechanisms to wage modern war.  
Closing the capabilities gap between Europe and America was going to require investment and long-term 
planning at a time when many European politicians believed that they no longer faced an acute security 
threat, and thus they were free to spend money on domestic priorities. The U.S. initiative to address the 
problem of skewed military capabilities was termed the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). This was to 
be a systematic way of prioritizing key areas for improvement such as deployability, mobility, sustainability 
and survivability of forces. DCI made strides toward identifying and quantifying the shortfalls in 
capabilities, but the task of narrowing the divide proved daunting. In fact, as U.S. defense expenditures 
rose, European spending fell, and the gap grew larger.[8]  
On the eve of the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, when it was clear DCI had not achieved the high aims 
set for it four years earlier, NATO changed directions and adopted a new program, the Prague Capability 
Commitment (PCC). Building on the experience from DCI, the PCC sought more concrete commitments 
from nations in specific areas. The PCC adopted new approaches to encourage nations to form 
multinational efforts and combine resources. Early indications are promising that real progress may be 
achieved in areas critical to military transformation, such as strategic lift and air-to-air refueling. But the 
success of PCC is still uncertain as the major expenditures underlying the robust political assertions are 
still in the future. 
The Nature of NATO 
In addition to a short-term domestic reluctance to invest in long-term military modernization, at least part 
of the perceived sluggishness of NATO's transformation can be found in the structure of NATO's decision-
making mechanisms. First and foremost is the requirement for consensus for any policy issue to become 
effective. Every Alliance member must agree in order for consensus to be reached on any proposed 
policy. This procedure worked well enough when the Alliance faced a real threat of invasion by a hostile 
power. The unanimity of sixteen nations in defense policy served as an awesome deterrent. But the 
challenges of the post-Cold-War environment are more complex and controversial. NATO found it 
relatively easy during the Cold War to agree on preparations for collective defense against an obviously 
menacing superpower. But recent NATO operations, such as the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 
or the Kosovo air campaign, tend to be discretionary in nature and thus more difficult to agree upon.  
To be fair, part of the problem is inherent in the nature of a collective defense institution. To the extent 
NATO acts in the name of its member nations, those members will quite naturally show caution in what 
they allow the organization to do on their behalf. The more freedom NATO has as an independent entity, 
the more likely the chance it may run afoul of certain national positions. The accidental bombing of the 
Chinese Embassy in Serbia in 1999 is a case in point. Although Chinese ire was directed primarily at the 
United States, each Alliance member is potentially responsible for what NATO forces do under a North 
Atlantic Council mandate. 
Drastic Times Call for . . . Moderate Measures 
The starting point for a military strategy must be the reality of the situation: reform will be limited because 
the countries that make up NATO are constrained by competing demands for domestic spending from 
making the long-term investments that would be required to achieve the ideal results of transition. Any 
European government that proposed a substantial increase in defense spending would not last long in 
office. Therefore, any military changes must be politically and economically acceptable to the home 
governments.  
Despite the draw-down of the past thirteen years, European nations of the Alliance still maintain a 
relatively large military force structure, reflecting a higher percentage of the population in uniform than 
that of the United States. With 2.8 million men and women in their armed forces, the European members 
of NATO retain more military manpower than the United States (1.4 million) and Russia (1.2. million) 
combined.[9] Most of these structures are euphemistically referred to as "in-place forces", meaning they 
cannot deploy or sustain themselves away from their home base.[10]  
Although transforming this huge quantity of military force in its entirety is beyond the means of even the 
most willing society,[11] a more realistic approach would be to concentrate on a small number of highly 
capable and deployable formations, while gradually reducing the active force structure. How much does 
NATO really need in the way of force structure in order to defend itself and provide needed stability to the 
North Atlantic region? Consider that the United States and the United Kingdom recently defeated Saddam 
Hussein's half million-man army in twenty-one days with a relatively small but technologically superior 
joint force, a result that seems to argue in favor of modernization and against maintaining large, obsolete 
land forces.  
Critical approaches to a transformational mindset include: 
• Focus on Expeditionary Capabilities. NATO has actually made significant progress in the area of 
improving its expeditionary capabilities. The creation of high readiness deployable headquarters 
and the creation of the NATO Response Force are clearly examples of success in this area.[12] 
But the overwhelming majority of European forces remain non-deployable, and serve to drain 
resources away from further transformation. The argument against in-place forces is one of scale 
rather than a recommendation for their complete elimination. However, the legitimate uses of 
forces for internal stability, disaster relief, riot control, etc, would hardly justify the some two 
million soldiers in this category for NATO's European members. These in-place forces should be 
cut and the money saved redirected to transformational initiatives.  
• Define the End-State. The hard work of transforming Alliance capabilities and forces must be 
seen to be working toward some well-defined and understood end-state, or it risks losing support 
of the home governments who will by necessity have to justify increased expenditures to their 
voting publics. Currently, NATO uses a multi-year force planning process to identify requirements 
and seek commitments from member nations based on politically approved level of ambition and 
updated threat assessments. Although this provides maximum flexibility for NATO as an 
organization, the fluctuation in requirements makes national planning more difficult than it would 
otherwise be with fixed targets. NATO should describe the face of the reformed Alliance in terms 
that both demonstrates its value and allows a consensus to develop for reaching intermediate 
steps. Without this vision, nations may be tempted to cut antiquated force structure without 
redirecting resources into needed transformational capabilities.  
• Understand the Cost. Military transformation, especially the kind which European militaries 
require in order to close the gap with the United States, will be expensive and institutionally 
difficult to implement. The savings from cutting in-place forces will not be enough to pay for the 
required initial expenditures in the area of transformation. These costs should be identified and 
articulated up front, allowing national home governments to plan for them in budgetary terms and 
to manage the political consequences.  
• Accept Risk. Transformation requires the acceptance of risk on a number of fronts. These risks 
should be defined, articulated and accepted from the beginning. First, the significant drawdown 
on in-place forces will unsettle those in the defense community who are both institutionally linked 
to the status quo and who continue to believe large land armies will be required for territorial 
defense at some point in the future. NATO planners should clarify these risks so that they can be 
openly discussed, thus allowing informed decisions to be made at the political level.  
• Reform the System. One of the major problems for any institutional reform is the tendency to 
allow the decision-making organizations that will be most affected by any new reform to be the 
party that controls the process and debate about that reform. Both NATO Headquarters and the 
national capitals engaged in defense reform will need to be aware of this tendency and ensure 
the right structures are modified or created in order to give impetus to reform initiatives.[13]  
Requiem or Prologue?  
Through a combination of strategic vision and energetic leadership, NATO so far has taken the first 
necessary steps toward needed reform. But as the Alliance moves further into the first decade of the 
twentieth century, it faces its own Rubicon. It must continue transforming in order to be relevant as a 
stabilizing force for security in the North Atlantic area and beyond. That transformation will require a level 
of effort and an expenditure of resources that will test the endurance of wealthy and complacent societies. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Europe Resources. 
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